



he dream is a telecommunications
future of fiber optic cables, com-
puter keyboards, video cameras,
tiny wireless personal communication
systems, and interactive access to the
world's information, art, culture, news and
entertainment.1 This cornucopia of ad-
vanced telecommunications technology
and services is being touted as the solution
to many of today's most pressing social
problems.2 And astonishingly, the magic
word "competition" will transform the
price of this electronic utopia to one which
all consumers can easily afford.
3
But behind this dream is the regulatory
reality: Reports,4 investigations,5 and leg-
islation6 on all fronts promise much, but
are sadly lacking on the substance of get-
ting from today's regulated monopolies in
telephone and cable television service to
tomorrow's competitive, affordable utopia.
This activity has raised many important
questions about the development and reg-
ulation of the "information superhighway,"
but the answers to most have proven elu-
sive. And one of the most intriguing un-
answered questions is: "What do we do
with universal service?
' 7
To most people, the term "universal
service" means the provision of basic
telephone service at reduced price to
low-income households which cannot af-
ford to pay full price. In California, this
mechanism is known as the Universal
Lifeline Telephone Service (ULTS or
"Lifeline"). 8 However, such low-income
subsidies are merely some of the more
recent and visible features of universal
service.
The term "universal service" was
popularized by American Telephone and
Telegraph (AT&T) President Theodore
Vail as early as 1907. 9 The closest thing
to a federal mandate for universal service
is found in Section 151 of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934.10 The Act author-
ized the Federal Communications Com-
mission to regulate communications "so
as to make available, so far as possible,
to all the people of the United States a
rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-
wide wire and radio communication ser-
vice with adequate facilities at reason-
able charges.. for the purpose of promot-
ing safety of life and property through
the use of...communication."
11
Historically, "universal service has
meant widespread access to voice-grade
telephone service, commonly referred to
as 'plain old telephone service' (POTS).'
' 2
The goal has been "to give all Americans
an opportunity to pick up the telephone
and, at a reasonable cost, have a voice
conversation with anyone else in the coun-
try or, increasingly, the world." 13 Gener-
ally, defining a measure of universal ser-
vice in the POTS era was relatively sim-
ple. Everyone should be allowed to re-
ceive basic telephone service at an afford-
able rate, regardless of their geographic
location. And anyone who could not af-
ford telephone service at the standard rate
should be allowed the opportunity to ob-
tain service at reduced rates. Tradition-
ally, the cost of providing below-cost ser-
vice to these groups has been recovered
through various cross-subsidies created by
above-cost pricinq of long distance and
business services. 
4
Now that telecommunications ser-
vices are about to move beyond the basic
service benchmark, arguments are being
advanced for the expansion of universal
service, and its underlying subsidies, to
include various additional enhanced ser-
vices. Once again, there is the dream and
the reality. Universal service must be ex-
panded, according to the dream, to make
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the advanced services of the information
superhighway available to the poor, those
in remote areas, minorities, and the phys-
ically challenged.15 Put advanced services
and technology in the hands of the in-
formation-poor and they will be poor no
more!
The reality is that the concept of "uni-
versal service" was invented by AT&T
as a marketing tool to woo regulatory
protection as a monopoly and to sell
more telephone service at an increased
cost. 16 Today's version of universal ser-
vice is based upon a series of inefficient
cross-subsidies which create deceptive
pricing incentives and will be im ractic-
able in a true competitive marketR There
is strong evidence that today's version of
universal service is based on false assump-
tions, and has been ineffective for certain
groups.18 Finally, universal service reg-
ulation, which is subject to manipulation
by the Regional Bell Operating Compa-
nies (RBOCs),19 allows these companies
to place the burden of the cost of devel-
oping advanced services on the consum-
ers of residential service, without provid-
ing substantial benefits to these consum-
ers in return.
20
This article will argue against the un-
necessary expansion of universal service,
and against additional or increased cross-
subsidization practices. Part II explores
the historical background of universal
service, and develops the evolution of
the term as a marketing tool of AT&T.
Part III describes the economic underpin-
nings of the universal service subsidy
system, and questions the viability of
such a system in a competitive market.
Part IV explores the past track record of
traditional universal service, while Part
V sketches the acknowledged benefits of
universal service.
Lastly, Part VI presents a set of pro-
posals to guide regulatory agencies in
shaping the future of the universal ser-
vice concept in competitive telecommu-
nications markets. These guidelines cen-
ter around a shift in focus from universal
service to universal access to all commu-
nications services. The best way to pro-
mote universal access goals is to set base-
line standards of connectivity, interoper-
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ability, and openness to which all service
providers must adhere in order to partic-
ipate in the market. All market partici-
pants must bear the cost of providing es-
sential services to special groups (e.g.,
low-income, geographically remote, phys-
ically challenged). Furthermore, all market
participants should be held to baseline se-
curity, privacy, and service quality stan-
dards, and must disclose accurate pricing
information and provide other relevant ed-
ucation to enable consumers to fairly
choose from competing services.
Finally, as regulation diminishes to al-
low competition, service providers should
be subject to heightened antitrust scru-
tiny, to ensure that anticompetitive prac-
tices (such as predatory pricing, price-
fixing, cartel conduct, and anticompeti-
tive mergers) are avoided.
II. A Brief History of
Universal Service
Although Theodore Vail was the first
to popularize the expression,2 1 Alexan-
der Graham Bell should be credited with
first articulating the dream of universal
telephone service.22 While promoting his
new invention in 1877, he correctly pre-
dicted that "a telephone in every house
would be considered indispensable."23 In
1878, Bell further described his vision:
[I]t is conceivable that cables of
telephone wires would be laid
under ground, or suspended over-
head, communicating by branch
wires with private dwellings,
counting houses, shops, manufac-
tories, etc., uniting them through
the main cable with a central of-
fice.. .Not only so but I believe in
the future wires will unite the head
offices of telephone companies in
different cities, and a man in one
part of the country may conmmuni-
cate by word of mouth with another
in a distant place.
24
Bell's small company grew quickly
and, after reorganization in 1878, Theo-
dore Vail was named general manager and
became the company's driving force.
25
Vail's vision of universal telephone ser-
vice evolved to "one system, one policy,
universal service." To Vail, this concept
meant the interconnection of local ex-
changes by long distance service.26 Vail
clearly contemplated a service in which
"universal" imlied everywhere, rather
than everyone.
The early development of the tele-
phone industry supports this view. After
Bell began selling his invention in 1877,
a patent dispute quickly arose with West-
ern Union, which had already patented a
similar invention.28 A settlement be-
tween the two companies in 1879 gave
Bell's company a virtual monopoly over
telephone technology for 17 years.
29
During this period, telephone service
rates could be set at levels considerably
above marginal cost, without regard for
the entry incentives created. In fact, it is
possible that the structure of the system
caused the retail price to be higher than
the profit-maximizing price because tele-
phones were rented to subscribers at mo-
nopoly prices, and connection charges
were also computed at monopoly rates.
30
This structure during the patent mo-
nopoly period was responsible for an ini-
tial rapid increase in telephone service,
followed by a slow increase once equi-
librium was reached.31 These reduced
demand levels during the latter years of
the patent period were probably caused
by Bell's anticompetitive pricing of tele-
phone rates. Furthermore, development
concentrated in the cities, with little ef-
fort given to rural lines or small towns.
Monopoly pricing, combined with the
Bell company's lack of interest in attract-
ing residential and rural customers, cre-
ated a reservoir of unsatisfied demand
and a strong inducement for entry of new
firms after the patent protection ex-
pired.
3 2
The Bell company achieved one major
benefit from the patent monopoly period
which gave it a distinct advantage over
potential competitors once the patent ex-
pired. This period enabled the company
to establish a strong telephone network
which, unlike the telephone itself, was a
strong barrier to new entry:
The telephone instrument itself
has few natural barriers to entry.
There are no significant economies
of scale in telephone set manufac-
turing and many companies had
the technological ability to produce
the sets ....The temporary patent
monopoly on telephone sets al-
lowed Bell to establish a monopoly
of telephone exchange service in
which much greater natural bar-
riers to entry existed.
33
However, when the initial patents ex-
pired in 1894, Bell experienced a period
of intense competition from many inde-
pendent companies. In 1895, there were
there were 252,000 telephones subscrib-
ers in the Unites States, representing an
overall penetration rate of less than .5%. 34
Only 10% of these telephones were used
by residential subscribers, and less than
3% of all telephone subscribers were in
located in rural areas. By 1920, after 25
years of competition, these figures had
changed dramatically. There were over
13 million telephones in the United States,
representin an overall penetration rate
of 12.69. However, 55% of these tele-
phones were residential, and the penetra-
tion in farm households had risen to
38.7%. In certain states, rural telephone
penetration had increased dramatically-
for instance, Iowa had a rural penetration
rate of over 86%.
The competition which arose around
the turn of the century has been described
as "access competition."36 Primarily be-
cause AT&T 37 refused to authorize its
subsidiaries to interconnect with compet-
ing firms, the concept of "dual service"
became prevalent. In this arrangement,
companies competed to be the first to sign
up subscribers for service. The telephone
system with the most subscribers became
the most attractive system, because more
people could be reached. While most ob-
servers have condemned dual service com-
petition as destructive competition,38 this
arrangement created three powerful in-
centives to universality: "(1) it rewards
the first to establish telephone xchanges
in unserved areas; (2) it creates pressure
to make the price of service as low as
possible, so as to attract new subscribers
and draw away subscribers from the other
system; [and] (3) it rewards those who in-
terconnect local exchanges with toll lines
as quickly and as extensively as possi-
ble."
39
These incentives may help to explain
the rapid penetration of telephones in
rural areas during this period. One ex-
ample was the development of "farmer
lines," systems of "informally organized
telephone lines to connect the farmers of
an area."40 These consisted of "a single
line in which all conversations reached
all subscribers or multiple lines with a
simple switchboard operated by one of
the farm families."4' These systems were
relatively inexpensive to construct, and
were a quick and efficient method of fill-
ing the demand for rural telephone ser-
vice. Once developed, these systems be-
came attractive buy-out targets for AT&T
and the independents because their ac-
quisition would quickly and cheaply ex-
pand the company's subscriber base.
42
Initially, AT&T's strategy to combat
the intense competition which followed
the initial patent period expiration con-
sisted of four elements: (1) developing
and patenting new technology to fore-
close competition; (2) cutting prices for
service; (3) developing long distance ser-
vice to interconnect its local systems,
while denying competitors access to its
network; and (4) attempting to purchase
or merge with competing services.43 The
ensuing rash of attempted mergers, com-
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bined with concerted refusals to allow
long distance connections with compet-
ing firms, drew the attention of both state
and federal regulators.44 Some states had
begun regulating telephone rates as early
as 1879.45 By 1910, all but a handful of
states had enacted statutes regulating tele-
phone service, and state antitrust action
had succeeded in preventing some merg-
ers and establishing limitations on AT&T's
conduct toward the independent compa-
nies.
46
In 1910, Congress enacted the first
federal telecommunications statute, giv-
ing the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion jurisdiction over the industry.47 Ad-
ditionally, AT&T entered into an agree-
ment with the U.S Department of Justice
in 1913 to refrain from acquiring directly
competing companies without prior De-
partment approval.48 This arrangement
was known as the Kingsbury Commitment,
because it was set forth in a letter from
AT&T Vice President N.C. Kingsbury to
J.C. McReynolds, U.S. Attorney General.
However, mergers continued after 1913
at a reduced rate.
49
Under increasing antitrust scrutiny
and the threat of more oppressive regu-
lation, Vail changed his strategy and
began to "embrace regulation rather than
fight it" 50:
By accepting regulation volun-
tarily, Bell reduced the risk that un-
favorable regulation would be im-
posed. The system of competing
federal and state regulation, to-
gether with the complex Bell struc-
ture, prevented real regulatory con-
trol while providing the protection
and legitimacy of a regulated util-
ity. Vail was...happy to accept reg-
ulation so long as it did not en-
croach on what were considered
management prerogatives... It gave
the Bell system a powerful weapon
to exclude competitors and justifi-
cation for seeking a monopoly, as
well as reducing the chances of
outright nationalization or serious
antitrust action.
5 1
Early on, Vail and AT&T adopted the
"universal service" rallying cry as the so-
cial justification for regulated monopoly
status. The "one system, one policy, uni-
versal service" theme is found repeatedly
in AT&T annual reports between 1907-
1914.52 But this concept differs substan-
tially from the "phone in every home"
idea that exists today. Vail's doctrine of
universal service had three main compo-
nents: (1) the value of telephone service
grew as the number of subscribers grew;
(2) universal service requires centralized
control, i.e., service should be provided
by a single firm; and (3) monopoly and
not interexchange of traffic among com-
peting systems was the best way to
achieve universal service.53 For Vail and
AT&T, universal service became not a
socially desirable goal, but a means to
effectively end all competition:
Vail's vision infused the Bell
System with a new coherence.
'Universal service' became a com-
petitive strategy, a political slogan
and a catchy advertising term all
in one .... Instead of fighting to
eliminate all independents, it
would absorb them into the
'universal' system by making them
noncompetitive feeders through
sublicensing.... Above all, univer-
sal service was the spearhead of
Vail's drive to achieve political
support for the elimination of com-
petition and the establishment of
regulated monopoly.
54
Vail's strategy was effective. In 1921,
Congress passed the Willis-Graham Act,
55
which effectively ended access competi-
tion by terminating the Kingsbury Com-
mitment and exempting telephone com-
panies from antitrust review.5 Vail's goal
of regulated monopoly status was fully re-
alized in 1934 with the federal Communi-
cations Act.57 This legislation created the
Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and consolidated all communica-
tions regulation under one entity.58 At this
time, to AT&T, "universal service" meant
a unified, interconnected monopoly, not a
system of cross-subsidies designed to pro-
mote universal household penetration of
telephone service.
59
Once it gained monopoly status, AT&T
developed a pricing policy that did pro-
vide the opportunity for every United
States household to acquire telephone
service at a reasonable cost.6° Known as
"nationwide average pricing," this policy
based the price of all calls on distance
between parties, not on cost of the ser-
vice. In addition, local and long distance
pricing and revenue recovery methods
were "separated," and long distance rev-
enues were pooled and repaid to local
exchange carriers in proportion to their
costs as "settlement" payments. These
and other methods of subsidizing local
service became known as "separations
and settlements."61 However, these prac-
tices are economically inefficient, and
could only have developed in a monop-
oly market.
62
Beginning in the late 1960s, AT&T
came under increasing pressure to accept
new competition for long distance ser-
vice.63 Its cross-subsidy practices quickly
became the basis of its "universal ser-
vice" argument against allowing compe-
tition for long distance service.64 AT&T
argued that the introduction of competi-
tion in the long distance market would
destroy the separations and settlements
subsidy system, and cause local service
prices to rise to a level that would be
unaffordable for many residential users.
Thus, AT&T contended that a competi-
tive long distance market would be con-
trary to the universal service "mandate"
imposed by the Communications Act of
1934. Milton Mueller observes that
[just as Vail had used the term
to fend off access competition from
1907 to 1920, AT&T attempted to
use the same term, albeit with a dif-
ferent meaning and in a very differ-
ent context, to renew the nation's
commitment to the regulated mo-
nopoly structure Vail had helped to
establish. The modem reconstruction
of universal service, however, was
not an accurate description of a his-
torical policy, but a retroactive ratio-
nalization for the institution of reg-
ulated monopoly.
65
In the end, competition for long dis-
tance service won out over AT&T's ar-
gument. But today, as competition for
local service is poised to descend on the
RBOCs' monopolies,66 the universal ser-
vice rallying call has suddenly resurfaced.
However, this time, the term is neither a
call for a centralized telephone system
nor a defense of the regulated monopoly
system, but a mandate for subsidizing a
host of new services and technologies in
a new competitive environment. To fully
understand this new treatment of the term
"universal service," it is necessary to un-
derstand the mechanics of subsidized
pricing of local service under the current
regulated monopoly structure.
11. The Mechanics of
Universal Service
The goal of a telephone company
manager is to earn enough revenue from
services offered to cover costs and return
a profit to the company's owners (i.e.,
the investors).67 In a competitive market,
the threat of price competition restricts
the amount of profit that can be earned.
68
Additionally, antitrust law protects new
entrants and competitors with smaller
market shares from anticompetitive prac-
tices by those competitors with larger
market shares. In a regulated monopoly
market, there is no competition; how-
ever, the amount of profit is limited by
both state and federal regulation.
69
Rates of services provided by a mo-
nopoly utility are generally set by a state
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public utilities commission, in an effort
to simulate a competitive environment.
70
Rather than establishing rates based solely
on recovery of sunk investment and mar-
ginal cost, regulators set rates with other
socially desirable goals in mind.71 Be-
cause there is no competition, certain ser-
vices may be priced higher than their cost;
these "monopoly" profits may then be
used to subsidize other services so that
they may be priced lower than cost. Such
cross-subsidies would not be possible in
a competitive market, because competi-
tors would undercut the price of the
above-cost service and steal customers
from the utility. This would in turn make
it impossible to provide the subsidized
service at below cost, because the reve-
nues required to support the lower prices
would disappear.
Universal service goals have tradi-
tionally been funded through a variety of
such price discrimination practices.
72
Generally, certain groups of customers
are provided basic service at a price that
is less than the cost of the service, to
encourage the universal availability of
basic service to these groups.73 Of course,
this means that other services are priced
above their respective costs.
These subsidies came to flow in
familiar directions: from long-dis-
tance service to.local service, from
business services to residential ser-
vices, and from urban ratepayers to
rural ratepayers. Once in place, the
system of subsidies was an addi-
tional reason not to permit compe-
tition, since low-cost competition
could destroy the telephone com-
panies' higher-priced services and
the politically popular subsidies
they provided to basic services.
74
One of the prevalent price discrimi-
nation strategies is geographic averag-
ing.75 Consider two customers-one lives
next door to the phone company, while
the other lives on a distant farm one mile
from the nearest telephone line. Under
geographic averaging price structures, both
will pay the same price for local service.
"Under this policy, the farmer will not
pay the full cost of his mile-long access
line; instead, he will pay the same rate
as the customer who lives across the street
from the central office. The farmer's ac-
cess line is subsidized by the urban rate-
payer. "76
Another example of price subsidy in
telephone service is value-of-service
pricing.77 Above-cost rates are imposed
on business customers and the surplus is
used to subsidize basic, residential ser-
vice. "The rationale is that the business
customers...derive substantial economic
benefit from their telephones, while res-
idential subscribers do not."
78
A third type of subsidy involves the
payment by long distance carriers of set-
tlement fees to local exchange carriers
(LECs).79 Generally, the LEC receives a
portion of all long distance revenues as
reimbursement for access to the local
"bottleneck" to connect long distance
calls. These payments have traditionally
subsidized the cost of local service.
80
Each of these methods of subsidizing
services is subject to erosion in a com-
petitive market. The competitor simply
prices the above-cost service at its mar-
ginal cost, and attracts those customers
away from the telephone company. The
telephone company is forced to lower its
prices, which causes the subsidy funding
to disappear. Then it must raise rates for
the subsidized service in order to recover
its costs for that service.
Another problem that exists with
cross-subsidy activity is predatory pric-
ing.8 1 A producer, by setting the price of
competitive services below cost, may be
able to force competitors out of the mar-
ket.82 Commentators have long debated
whether predatory pricing is ever econom-
ically feasible in an unregulated market,
83
and courts are generally skeptical of
predatory pricing claims. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has declared that "such
claims are rarely tried and even more
rarely successful.
84
However, in a market where one firm
offers both regulated monopoly services
and related competitive services, this
practice could conceivably be used to
drive competitors out of business.85 The
firm merely allocates the deficit incurred
from selling the competitive product at
below cost to the expense side of the led-
ger for the regulated service, then peti-
tions the regulatory entity for a price in-
crease based on the spurious expense
data.86 The regulator grants the price in-
crease, but the regulated service is now
priced above-cost, and the additional
revenues in effect subsidize the preda-
tory-priced product.
87
Finally, one more practice which may
affect both competition and universal
service subsidies deserves mention. Be-
cause it may not be feasible to construct
multiple telecommunications networks
to serve the same customers, the LECs
may be required to sell access to their "bot-
tleneck" local networks to competing
service providers.88 The LEC may be
tempted to price such interconnection
fees higher than the cost it incurs to de-
liver the same service. This would be
anticompetitive, because it would allow
the LEC to keep the competition's costs
of providing the service higher than its
own. Antitrust law attempts to preclude
such practices through the requirements
of the "essential facilities doctrine."
89
This doctrine provides that where a firm
controls a resource that cannot practica-
bly be duplicated by competitors, and
without which competition is infeasible,
the firm must make that resource avail-
able to competitors on reasonable terms
and conditions.90 Therefore, when com-
peting service providers must utilize the
local network to reach the consumer,
LECs must allow this interconnection at
the same price that it costs the LEC to
deliver the same service.
In sum, a universal service system
which relies upon artificial cross-subsi-
dies cannot exist in a fully competitive
market. Competition does not allow as-
sured profit from one population which
may simply be transferred to support an-
other. In order to retain universal service,
a regulatory regime must be interposed
in a newly-competitive market-but is
universal service worth the price? To an-
swer this question, we must look at the
track record of universal service to de-
termine whether its benefits outweigh
the costs of regulation.
IV. Has Universal Service
Been Effective?
"Universal service" has become an
umbrella term for a variety of subsidy
mechanisms designed to get telephones
into the hands of the most people. With
the impending telecommunications "rev-
olution" of advanced services and the in-
troduction of competition at all levels of
service, this model of ensuring access to
all is being questioned. In addition to the
points already raised in Parts I (that uni-
versal service is primarily a marketing tool
of the RBOCs) and II (that the subsidy
framework is economically inefficient in
a competitive market), three other rea-
sons justify a reexamination of universal
service.
First, there is evidence that the pres-
ent system of promoting universal access
to basic telephone service has not been
as effective as advertised. It is common
to treat the goal of universal service as
fully realized, but in fact many house-
holds still lack basic telephone service.
91
Approximately six million households in
the United States do not have a tele-
phone.92 This is about 6.7% of all United
States households.93 However, these per-
centages increase substantially for low-
income and minority households and
households headed by those under 25
years of age.94 Two-thirds of households
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headed by African-Americans between
age 16 and 24 with annual incomes under
$5,000 do not have a telephone.
95
These statistics have caused many ob-
servers to conclude that universal service
has not enjoyed the success that the tele-
phone companies claim.96 These low
penetration rates appear to result from a
variety of factors. Undoubtedly, for the
lowest-income groups, even subsidized
telephone service is simply too expen-
sive.97 There is also evidence that lan-
guage barriers and the need for increased
public education, at least among certain
groups, contribute to reduced levels of
penetration.98 Additionally, in certain low-
penetration states, regulators appear not
to have pressed telephone franchisees to
extend service to the most remote areas
and to pockets of poverty.
99
A second problem with universal
service relates to arguments in favor of
expanding universal service to include
advanced telecommunications services.
These arguments are founded on the "in-
formation-rich/information poor" rift in
our society 00 This theory is based on
the assumption that new information tech-
nologies will have a greater effect upon
those individuals who are already better-
informed, better-educated, and of higher
socioeconomic status.101 In order to narrow
the gap between the information "haves"
and "have-nots," many argue that it is
essential to provide affordable, easy ac-
cess to advanced communications and in-
formation services. 102
However, there is increasing evidence
that the mere availability of advanced
services does little to narrow the gap be-
tween the information-rich and the infor-
mation-poor. A recent study by Mueller
and others found that minority and low-
income urban areas consume a dispro-
portionate amount of advanced telecom-
munications services such as cable tele-
vision and pay television services.
103
Mueller suggests that the biggest risk is
not the denial of access to advanced ser-
vices, but the inducement to the poor to
buy services they cannot afford.104 Muel-
ler also found that many inner-city house-
holds without telephone service have ac-
cess to cable television service.105 These
findings suggest that other methods of
narrowing the information gap may be
more effective than simply providing sub-
sidized services.
106
The third problem with the traditional
universal service regime is that it can be-
come merely a disguise for anticompeti-
tive and anti-consumer practices by util-
ities. Already discussed are situations
where the LECs attempt to use cross-
subsidy revenues to engage in predatory
pricing. 107 Another abuse results when
the LEC diverts revenues from basic,
residential service to subsidize the re-
search and development of advanced
plant and services.108 This practice ef-
fectively cheats the basic service rate-
payer, who probably will receive no cor-
responding benefit from the newly de-
veloped services.
In an unregulated, competitive mar-
ket, a firm cannot simply raise prices to
fund new development. It must either
use capital on hand or raise additional
capital through the debt and equity mar-
kets.10 9 The investors in the company
share the risk that the new development
will fail, and will share any profits if it
is successful. If, however, a monopoly
utility funds new development through
increases in basic service rates, the rate-
payers take on the risk of the investment.
If the investment is successful, the com-
pany may be tempted to pass the in-
creased earnings directly to its investors,
thus denying the ratepayers a return on
the investment.
Recently, the California Public Utili-
ties Commission determined that Pacific
Telesis did just that, when it attempted
to "spin off' its cellular and paging di-
vision without returning some of the
profit from the sale to ratepayers. 1 0 The
Commission determined that Telesis had
funded its research and development of
cellular service with ratepayer revenues,
and that some of these revenues hould
be returned to the ratepayers."' It would
be easy to envision an LEC being equally
tempted to finance the development of an
advanced, broadband network through
increases in basic service rates, then pric-
ing the service so that it may be unafford-
able for the ratepayers who have funded
it.
V. Balancing the Costs and
Benefits of Universal Service
So, one might ask, if universal ser-
vice is simply a self-serving marketing
tool of the telephone companies, incom-
patible with competitive markets, and in
many cases simply does not work, then
why not do away with it? In fact, some
have argued that universal service should
be abandoned in favor of other more
modernistic approaches to service ac-
cess.'l2 However, traditional universal
service has served an important role in
telecommunications development, and its
continued presence is supported by sev-
eral meritorious arguments.
First, there is an undoubted need for
universal access to basic telephone ser-
vice.1 13 Telephone and related technol-
ogy has become an "indispensable life-
savin tool[] during the twentieth cen-
tury. " 4 It gives individuals the ability
to quickly connect with emergency as-
sistance, medical care, essential business
and professional services, and cultural and
societal contacts. Moreover, it is vital to
advancing the democratic process and the
fundamental rights of free speech and as-
sociation.
115
There well may be certain advanced
services116 that will, at some point in the
future, achieve the degree of importance
to society that basic service currently has
achieved.t1 7 If and when this occurs,
there will be a justifiable need to provide
such advanced services to socioeconomic
groups who normally would not be able
to afford them.
Second, basic service will likely con-
tinue to be unavailable to certain groups,
absent some form of support mechanism.
The lowest income groups will not be
able to afford any cost-based service,
even if driven to the lowest possible price
by competition.1 18 Also, certain individ-
uals in remote or poverty-stricken areas
may be denied service because it is not
commercially viable to provide service
to those individuals. To the extent such
"electronic redlining" occurs, it must be
resolved through a support mechanism.
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Finally, specialized equipment required
by physically disadvantaged individuals
may require a subsidy to enable such
equipment to be universally available to
them.
Third, the need for some framework
for consumer protections will arise out
of the transition from a regulated tele-
communications market to competitive
telecommunications market. In the past,
consumers have relied upon regulatory
entities to protect their interests in fair
pricing and marketing practices, service
quality, network security, and privacy.
But as competition increases and regula-
tion shrinks, the importance of protecting
the consumer in these interactions will
arguably fall under the universal service
umbrella.120 In the future, consumer safe-
guards should be implemented, particu-
larly in the transition from regulated
market to competitive market.'2 These
safeguards should be universally avail-
able.
Finally, as the "information super-
highway" unfolds, there will be a need
for adequate education to show all indi-
viduals the importance of advanced ser-
vices and the procedures for appropri-
ately and efficiently using them. The im-
portance of closing the information gap
has already been mentioned.122 It will
also be essential for consumers to have
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access to educational assistance to better
avoid potential abuses which might arise
due to the competitive nature of the tele-
communications market. Consumers will
require some method of obtaining infor-
mation-not only concerning pricing and
service quality of competing services,
but also to enable them to avoid potential
abuses such as excessive charges or un-
knowing risks to the security and privacy
of the information they transmit through
these new services.
Conceding that some guarantee of
baseline universal service standards is
required, and assuming that the current
universal service regime will be unac-
ceptable in a competitive telecommuni-
cations market, several commentators
have developed an alternative to the tra-
ditional model of universal service.
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The final part of this article discusses a
proposed "universal access" model for
establishing baseline access guarantees




An alternative approach to the tradi-
tional universal service model is the con-
cept of universal access.124 Instead of
mandating that.specific services be made
available at certain prices, universal ac-
cess regulation would simply require that
whatever services are available be made
available to all on a nondiscriminatory
basis. Then, if certain groups, such as
low-income families, remain unable to
afford some or all of the services offered,
targeted assistance programs would be in
place to encourage these at-risk groups
to subscribe to those services that are es-
sential to participation in society. To
avoid difficult choices regarding the "es-
sential" nature of services, any service
to which at least 51% of all residential
customers subscribe should be considered
"essential" to participation in society.125
Next, the universal access model would
require that providers of the actual tele-
communications connection, or the
"wire" into the home, would be sepa-
rated or "unbundled" from providers of
the content that is being offered through
the "wire." Service providers (those who
provide the "wire") would be regulated
as common carriers,126 and would be
subject to a set of service standards and
consumer safeguards, including privacy
and security standards. Content provid-
ers would then be substantially deregu-
lated and free to compete aggressively,
subject to strict antitrust scrutiny to min-
imize anticompetitive practices.127 Both
service providers and content providers
would be required to support public ed-
ucation and training mandates, and to
disclose accurate price and service infor-
mation for comparison by consumers.
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The universal access model stresses
equal access to all services. The driving
force of the universal access model is com-
petition, not government regulation of a
monopoly provider. In order to promote
equality of access, however, certain base-
line standards must be established. The Al-
liance for Public Technology (APT)129 has
developed a set of specific actions and
approaches which serve as the basis for
the following guidelines.'30 The APT's
approach would require any telecommu-
nications service provider to meet the fol-
lowing guidelines in order to enter the
market: (1) specified connectivity, inter-
operability, and openness standards; (2)
specified service quality, security, and pri-
vacy safeguards at no additional cost to
consumers; and (3) mandatory contribu-
tions to a "universal service" fund, which
would be administered by an entity which
itself is not a provider. 131
To ensure universal access, advanced
telecommunications services must be
fully accessible to everyone. This con-
cept has been expressed as connectivity.
The network should connect every home,
school, library, business and health care
provider.132 To the extent that the com-
petitive market fails to provide such con-
nectivity, targeted incentive programs or
regulation may be necessary to promote
optimum connectivity. There is evidence,
however, from the historical development
of the existing telephone system that
competition will not fail in the goal of
universal connectivity. Widespread avail-
ability of telephones to rural areas oc-
curred only after AT&T lost its patent
monopoly. At that time, competing ser-
vices developed low-cost "farmer lines"
and other methods of serving rural resi-
dents.133 There is evidence that this may
already be occurring today with rural ac-
cess to electronic mail and the Inter-
net. 134
Another requirement of the universal
access model is that all services be inter-
operable. If competition is to be success-
ful, it is essential that users of different
or competing networks be able to inter-
connect. It was in part the refusal of
AT&T to allow competing companies to
connect to its system which led to the calls
for regulated monopoly treatment.135 The
Clinton administration's National Infor-
mation Infrastructure report has recognized
the importance of full interoperability. 1
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Again, in the interests of reaching the
most customers, competition should cre-
ate incentives to encourage interconnec-
tion of competing services; however,
uniform national or international techni-
cal standards should be developed and
implemented to facilitate this require-
ment.
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Related to the idea of interoperability
is the concept of openness. Openness is
essential to universal access for two rea-
sons. First, the system should be capable
of both sending and receiving all types
of information.-138 Second, the technol-
ogy relied upon by these service provid-
ers must create an open network, to allow
the full implementation of interoperabil-
ity and connectivity goals.139 Therefore,
both services and networks must be open
and available to all.
Another element of APT's universal
access model is the incorporation of the
consumer safeguards of security, service
quality, and privacy. 140 Specific baseline
standards should be mandated by the
federal government, available to all users
on an equal basis. Consumers should not
be forced to pay more for these funda-
mental standards. Consumers should also
be made aware of what they should ex-
pect from services in this regard.
14 1
The competitive market should be al-
lowed to function as freely as possible,
without interference from the govern-
ment. Existing internalized cross-subsidy
practices should be dismantled in favor
of cost-based, competitive pricing. Only
where there is a specific market failure
should service be subsidized, and then
the subsidy should be an external cost
absorbed proportionately by all market
participants.
One area where targeted subsidies will
be required is to ensure that low-income
individuals have adequate access to any
service which at least 51% of all resi-
dential customers have adopted. The APT
suggests that all telecommunications pro-
viders contribute to a universal service
fund, which would be used to provide low-
er-cost service to low-income individu-
als. 142 These contributions should be al-
located according to the market share of
the individual provider. The fund should
be administered by an entity which is not
itself a service provider. 143 These subsi-
dies might take the form of credits or
vouchers which could be used to pay for
the services. Additionally, a portion of this
fund should be earmarked for public ed-
ucation for low-income, minority, and
physically impaired groups. Education
should be provided at no cost, and should
focus on the value of basic information
services to these groups.
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The universal access model is based
on a competitive market. Competition re-
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quires reduced and uniform regulatory
oversight. However, it is important to en-
sure that none of the competing service
providers be allowed to obtain an unfair
competitive advantage. Therefore, two
mechanisms should be implemented to
ensure fair competition and minimize
consumer abuses.
First, service providers must be reg-
ulated as common carriers.145 This will
ensure that all users are able to originate,
as well as receive, communications. It
will also require that the carrier itself be
separated or "unbundled" from the actual
content of the information provided.
Telephone service is currently provided
on a common carriage basis, although
the RBOCs are lobbying to be allowed
to provide content as well, especially
with regard to video programming.146
Cable television is not currently based on
a common carriage system; cable franchis-
ees may pick and choose their program-
ming content. Some commentators have
suggested that cable television operators
be treated as common carriers as well.147
Second, the entire telecommunica-
tions industry should be subject to height-
ened antitrust scrutiny in return for reduced
regulation. Service providers should be
monitored closely for anticompetitive prac-
tices, because the high costs of network
infrastructure will make new entry diffi-
cult and will likely reduce the total num-
ber of competitors to a few. Thus the like-
lihood of price-fixing, predatory pricing,
and denial of access to essential facilities
will increase.148 Also, the possibility of
anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions
must be recognized. Service providers
who also provide content must be scru-
tinized to prevent unfair tying agreements
or predatory pricing.1
49
For content providers, new entry will
be easier, so there will likely be more
competitors and healthier competition.
However, the opportunity for mergers
and consolidations to create an oligopoly
market exists. Again, antitrust scrutiny
must be vigorous to ensure that content
providers maintain a competitive market.
VII. Conclusion
The telecommunications market is
very complex and difficult to compre-
hend. Apart from those set forth here,
other safeguards may be necessary to en-
sure universal access to the full panoply
of new age communications services that
the information superhighway promises
to deliver. However, it is essential that
adequate safeguards be developed now,
before the new infrastructure is in place.
Once these new services are accepted by
consumers, it will be much more difficult
to place limitations on them.
The ability to communicate freely is
a fundamental right in the United States,
and a cornerstone of our democratic so-
ciety. The telecommunications revolu-
tion has the potential to create fascinat-
ing new ways to advance the interests of
democracy. But unless advanced tele-
communications technology is handled
properly, with appropriate standards for
universal access and consumer safeguards,
this potential could reduce or even evap-
orate our present ability to communicate
freely. It would be sad indeed to waste
such a rare opportunity.
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